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Connecticut established telephone-based gram-posi-
tive rod (GPR) reporting primarily to detect inhalational
anthrax cases more quickly. From March to December
2003, annualized incidence of blood isolates was
21.3/100,000 persons; reports included 293 Coryne-
bacterium spp., 193 Bacillus spp., 73 Clostridium spp., 26
Lactobacillus spp., and 49 other genera. Aound-the-clock
GPR reporting has described GPR epidemiology and
enhanced rapid communication with clinical laboratories.
I
dentifying intentional Bacillus anthracis exposures
quickly is essential for limiting human illness and death
(1). During the 2001 anthrax attack, inhalational anthrax
developed in 11 persons, and 5 died (2). Initial laboratory
evidence of anthrax infection came from routine diagnostic
blood cultures, which yielded B. anthracis in all 8 patients,
who had not received antimicrobial drug therapy before
blood cultures were obtained (3,4). Less than 24 hours
elapsed from the time each patient’s blood was drawn and
the culture inoculated, until their culture was initially noted
to have bacterial growth and preliminarily identified as
gram-positive rods by immediate microscopic examination
of a Gram stain. However, species-specific identification
generally took several more days since additional laborato-
ry testing of the bacterial isolate was required. 
The Connecticut inhalational anthrax patient was intu-
bated for mechanical ventilation during the 2-day delay
between preliminary identification of gram-positive rods
in blood culture and laboratory results specifically sug-
gesting B. anthracis. According to then-existing require-
ments, the Connecticut Department of Public Health
(CDPH) was not notified until B. anthracis was suspected.
Public health officials were unable to interview the patient,
who never recovered. 
Since January 1, 2003, Connecticut laboratories and
physicians have been required to report any gram-positive
rod (GPR) identified from blood or cerebrospinal fluid
(CSF) to CDPH. CDPH requested that laboratories call
immediately if the isolate was identified within 32 hours of
inoculation. This was the first time CDPH required labora-
tories to report a finding immediately by telephone.
Surveillance objectives were to detect anthrax septicemia
or meningitis more quickly, ensure around-the-clock labo-
ratory reporting of potential bioterrorism events, and
describe the epidemiology of GPR septicemia and menin-
gitis in the absence of an intentional B. anthracis release.
Across the nation, local, state, and federal agencies
have been pilot testing a variety of surveillance approach-
es to detect intentional disease outbreaks more quickly
(5–10). Approaches have included syndromic surveillance
(6–8) and environmental air monitoring for potential
bioterrorism agents (9,10). We describe results from the
inaugural year of CDPH’s unique laboratory-based sur-
veillance system.
The Study
At the end of January 2003, Connecticut clinical labo-
ratories were notified by mail that GPR isolates identified
from CSF or blood within 72 hours of culture inoculation
must be reported to CDPH Epidemiology Program. CDPH
asked laboratories to call the department immediately if
the isolate was identified within 32 hours of inoculation
and collected either from an outpatient or an inpatient
within 3 days of admission. Other GPR reports were to be
mailed to CDPH. Although CDPH was most interested in
timely telephone reporting of isolates identified within 24
hours of inoculation, we chose 32 hours to identify isolates
missed in laboratories lacking sufficient staff to continu-
ously examine blood cultures during night shifts (general-
ly 8-hour periods). Blood cultures were processed
according to each clinical laboratory’s usual culture prac-
tices since reported culture isolates were obtained from
routine diagnostic testing. In clinical settings, blood cul-
tures are generally performed by filling commercially
manufactured bottles, primed to promote either anaerobic
or aerobic bacterial growth, with the patient’s blood at the
time of phlebotomy. Culture bottles are then brought to the
clinical laboratory for incubation.
Immediate clinical follow-up was conducted whenever
>1 of the patient’s blood culture bottles yielded the isolate
within 32 hours of inoculation and for all CSF isolates.
This follow-up involved clinically characterizing the
patient’s illness through telephone discussion with the
patient’s physician or inpatient nurse to determine whether
the illness was suspicious for anthrax (e.g., respiratory
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ograph). Laboratory follow-up was conducted for all iso-
lates, with daily laboratory contact until genus
identification. For Bacillus spp., laboratories were asked to
report isolates’hemolysis and motility characteristics, and,
if necessary, isolates were forwarded to Connecticut’s state
laboratory to rule out B. anthracis by γ-phage lysis. 
Laboratory audits were conducted to ensure complete
reporting of qualifying isolates; 33 of Connecticut’s 34
clinical laboratories participated. We provided laboratories
a list of GPR genera, and they provided a list of blood and
CSF cultures that had yielded these genera within 72 hours
of inoculation during 2003. We compared patient names,
culture dates, and results with the 2003 GPR reports to
identify unreported isolates. 
Chart reviews were performed for Clostridium isolates
to obtain etiology and underlying medical conditions.
Health department labor resources were estimated by staff
questionnaire administered October 2003. Because labora-
tories required several weeks to implement the reporting
requirement after notification, the analysis period was lim-
ited to March–December 2003. In addition, only the first
isolate from a given patient’s illness was counted in this
analysis.
From March to December 2003, a total of 623 GPR iso-
lates were identified. CSF isolates were few (5 total: 2
Listeria spp., 2 Bacillus spp., and 1 Corynebacterium sp.).
By genus, blood isolates included 293 Corynebacterium
spp., 193 Bacillus spp. (none B. anthracis), 73 Clostridium
spp., 26 Lactobacillus  spp., 14 Listeria  spp., 10
Propionibacterium  spp., and 9 other genera (Table 1).
Annualized incidence of GPR blood isolates was
21.3/100,000 persons. Twenty-three of the 195 Bacillus iso-
lates were forwarded to Connecticut’s state laboratory to
rule out B. anthracis by γ-phage lysis (all were negative).
Among the 498 blood isolates with available incubation
period, 171 (34%) isolates grew in <24 hours. Of these,
131 (76%) were reported to CDPH: 97 by telephone (61%
reported on date detected and 42% reported outside office
hours), 31 by mail, and 2 by unknown reporting method.
Overall, 82% of these rapid-growing isolates were either
Bacillus (52%) or Clostridium spp. (30%).
Unreported isolates (n = 304) identified by laboratory
audit only grew more slowly (80% incubation period >24
hours versus 54% of reported isolates, p<0.001) and/or
presumed contaminants (65% Corynebacterium spp.).
Nearly all (98%) unreported isolates were from clinical
laboratories that had reported other isolates but failed to
report all isolates. Corynebacterium isolates (all nondiph-
theria species, i.e., “diphtheroids”) were less likely to be
reported than other genera (30% vs. 70%; p<0.001). 
Clostridium isolates grew significantly more quickly
in blood culture than other genera (median incubation
15.3 hours; Table 2) and more frequently in inoculated
anaerobic culture bottles (68%) than in aerobic culture
bottles (13%). Annualized incidence of clostridial bac-
teremia was 2.3/100,000 persons, excluding 6 postmortem
cultures likely due to agonal bacteremia. The 67 patients
were elderly (median age 76 years) and frequently criti-
cally ill (22 deaths). Many (56%) had an intraabdominal
source identified. Underlying immune-compromise (49%)
and malignancy (60%) were common; 24% had neither
condition.
From March to September 2003, an average of 56 staff
hours was required per month to receive, respond to, and
process reports. For September 2003 specifically, the most
recent month assessed, aggregate personnel time was 45
hours (20% outside office hours). 
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A major public health preparedness challenge is
increasing the sensitivity and timeliness of recognition of
individual, potentially sentinel cases of category A bioter-
rorism agent disease. Each category A agent has unique
clinical and diagnostic features: no one system can meet
the challenge for all agents. For anthrax, we attempted to
shorten the time from occurrence of the earliest specific
diagnostic finding, GPR identified by Gram stain of blood
or CSF culture, to notification of the public health system.
In doing so, we established an around-the-clock GPR lab-
oratory reporting system with <1 full-time staff position.
The system has enhanced rapid communication between
CDPH and laboratories and provided baseline information
on GPR sepsis epidemiology. 
The first system objective was earlier detection of
anthrax septicemia and meningitis. Additional anthrax
cases have not occurred to test this system, and most
Bacillus isolates are attributable to culture contamination.
However, through auditing, we determined that 62% of
Bacillus isolates identified within 24 hours of inoculation
were reported by telephone. Improvement is needed, but,
through auditing, the system tracks the timeliness and
completeness of reporting and speciation of all Bacillus
organisms, including, potentially, the next B. anthracis
isolate. 
Overcoming laboratory personnel’s reticence to report
results that are likely spurious culture contaminants has
been a challenge of implementing the system. This reti-
cence is reflected by the low reporting rate for
Corynebacterium  spp. (i.e., “diphtheroids”) with their
unique Gram stain appearance and rare association with
pathology. Despite this, our analysis indicates that the sys-
tem has met its second objective of ensuring around-the-
clock laboratory reporting of potential bioterrorism events,
given that many GPR reports were made by telephone out-
side office hours. 
The third system objective was to describe baseline
GPR septicemia and meningitis epidemiology. Most clini-
cally important isolates were Clostridium spp. Like B.
anthracis, Clostridium spp. grow rapidly in blood culture
and can produce a life-threatening sepsis syndrome.
However, during a repeat anthrax attack, the distinct epi-
demiology of clostridial sepsis could help differentiate
clostridial sepsis from inhalational anthrax among persons
who are critically ill with a GPR sepsis. Clostridium spp.
predominately grow in anaerobic culture bottles, and
clostridial sepsis usually affects elderly persons with
abdominal conditions, malignancy, or immune suppression
(11,12). Notably, recent clostridial sepsis outbreaks involv-
ing contaminated tissue transplants and illicit drugs have
an epidemiology different from this baseline, in which ill-
ness predominately affects persons <50 years of age
(13–15).
An ongoing challenge to this surveillance approach is
that no precise clinical algorithm exists for how to readily
identify whether a bacterium isolated from blood culture is
from culture contamination. This uncertainty complicates
the triage of isolates’ clinical importance even with physi-
cian consultation. 
The GPR surveillance system continues with modifica-
tion. Beginning January 2004, Connecticut laboratories are
now required to report by telephone any blood or CSF
specimen with growth of GPRs within 32 hours of inocu-
lation. Growth after 32 hours is no longer reportable, to
reduce reporting of culture contaminants without signifi-
cantly sacrificing sensitivity to detect anthrax or clostridi-
al infections. Immediate clinical follow-up is conducted on
isolates most likely to be sentinel events: aerobic bottle
isolates (possible anthrax event) and anaerobic isolates in
patients < 50 years of age (unusual Clostridium event). 
The earliest possible knowledge of an anthrax attack
could minimize illness and death by allowing more lead
time for intervention. Connecticut has successfully imple-
mented a laboratory-based system that allows for early
detection of even a single case of inhalational anthrax.
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